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Abstract
The nature and role of additive transformations to rewards are elucidated for a gen-
eral class of deterministic, nonautonomous, optimal control problems with many state
and control variables. Conditions relating to the optimal choice of initial and terminal
times and initial and terminal values of state variables are identified such that additive
transformations affect optimal plans. General comparative static results are derived and
the framework is extended to cover two common classes of stochastic control prob-
lems. Three applications are presented: the canonical adjustment cost model of a firm,
a stochastic extension of an irreversible pollution accumulation problem with regime
switching and an extension of a lifecycle model of retirement in which an agent’s retire-
ment wealth evolves stochastically.
JEL classifications: C61, D92, J26
1 Introduction
Dynamic problems in economics in which an agent must choose an optimal initial, terminal or
switching time in addition to the optimal paths of control variables – examples include lifecycle
models of retirement, the optimal time at which to choose a new policy regime and the optimal
time at which to terminate extraction of a nonrenewable resource – are commonplace. Also
commonplace are problems in which an agent’s rewards are subject to additive transformations,
capturing such phenomena as a firm’s fixed operating costs, the disutility of employment, the
cost of a regime switch and the presence of shocks to future flows of wealth. Despite this,
a general framework for studying deterministic control problems in the presence of additive
transformations to rewards has yet to be established. Perhaps this is because of a mistaken
belief acquired from static optimization theory that such transformations have no bearing on
the solution. Surprisingly, such transformations do affect behaviour in dynamic optimization
problems under conditions which are prevalent in economics.
Accordingly, this paper derives the conditions under which additive transformations to re-
wards affect optimal plans for a general class of deterministic, nonautonomous, optimal control
problems with many state and control variables. The class varies according to the freedom given
to the decision-maker to choose the initial and terminal times of the planning horizon and the
initial and terminal values of the state variables. Salvage functions are included and a general
and comprehensive set of comparative statics results is established.
Although the framework uses methods from deterministic optimal control theory, it is ex-
tended to cover two classes of stochastic control problems in which the variance of idiosyncratic
shocks to a state equation appears additively in an agent’s bequest function at the time of a
regime switch. It is intended that the set of propositions contained herein may be referred to by
researchers solving the aforementioned problems, circumventing the need for them to derive their
own closed-form solutions or carry out analysis by simulation in cases where theoretical results
are unambiguous, highlighting the importance of closed-form solutions and simulations when
they are not. Researchers dealing with the latter scenario are referred to the general methods
set out in Caputo and Wilen (1995); researchers dealing with the important case of comparative
statics for discount rates, in both deterministic and stochastic settings, are referred to Quah and
Strulovici (2013).
There is a wide range of literature to which the methods may be applied, as the three examples
of section 5 illustrate. In the canonical adjustment cost model of a firm, it is shown how a flow
of sunk fixed costs affects a firm’s shut-down decision. In a stochastic extension of Tahvonen
and Withagen’s (1996) pollution accumulation problem with regime switching, it is shown how
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uncertainty about the critical threshold of the pollution stock affects the optimal timing of a
move to irreversible pollution accumulation. In Prettner and Canning’s (2014) lifecycle model of
retirement, the evolution of retirement income is subjected to idiosyncratic shocks. Other areas
for fruitful application of the methods include optimal regime switching and technology adoption
decisions (such as in the models of Boucekkine et al. (2004), Boucekkine et al. (2013), Valente
(2011) and Grass et al. (2012)) and optimal workplace reorganization (Vallee´ and Moreno-Galbis
(2011)).
2 Background
One of the fundamental results in the atemporal theory of a firm states that, once a profit-
maximizing firm has decided to produce, a change in any type of fixed cost does not affect
the optimal mix of factors of production, nor the profit-maximizing rate of output. Avoidable
fixed costs do, however, impact a firm’s decision about when to shut-down, whereas sunk fixed
costs do not (Besanko and Brauetigam 2013).
Contributions to various strands of the deterministic control literature have shown these con-
clusions to be in need of modification. For example, Farmer (1997) modelled environmental
mandates as fixed and variable costs and showed how optimal production decisions and closure
dates were affected by the nature of the particular mandate. In the natural resource literature,
Schmalensee (1976) solved what is more or less the prototypical nonrenewable resource extrac-
tion problem with the addition of a flow of avoidable fixed costs. The cost is fixed because it is
independent of the rate of production for positive rates; it is avoidable because it falls discontin-
uously to zero when the rate of production is zero. Schmalensee showed that the optimal length
of a firm’s planning horizon decreases as the flow of avoidable fixed costs increase. In a similar
vein, Siebert (1983) demonstrated that an increase in the flow of sunk fixed costs – as opposed to
avoidable fixed costs – decreases the optimal length of the planning horizon. Lewis et al. (1979)
introduced a flow of avoidable fixed costs into a nonrenewable resource extraction problem and
showed that, under a certain set of assumptions, a monopolist owner of a fixed nonrenewable
resource stock extracts the stock at a faster rate than is socially optimal.
Models of the optimal time at which to switch policy regimes have also considered additive
fixed costs. For example, Tomiyama (1985) and Makris (2001) derived necessary and sufficient
conditions for the optimal switching time in finite and infinite horizon control problems, respec-
tively, and Makris included a fixed switching cost which was a function of the state variable at
the time of switching. Literature on the optimal retirement decision (Prettner and Canning 2014,
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Rogerson and Wallenius 2013) considered the disutility of employment (an additive fixed cost).
Valente (2011) considered the role of fixed switching costs in a model of endogenous growth and
backstop technology adoption.
Despite these developments, a general set of results for the effect of additive transformations
on optimal decisions in deterministic control models has yet to be established. The framework
presented herein applies to a general class of deterministic, nonautonomous, optimal control
problems with many state and control variables and so nests all of the above models as special
cases. The propositions are applicable to deterministic control models involving the choice of
initial or terminal times and/or the choice of the initial or terminal values of the state variables
under additive transformations to rewards. Results are not limited to problems in deterministic
optimal control, however. In section 4 they are extended to cover two classes of stochastic
optimal control problems, utilizing the method of backward induction to obtain expressions for
stage two value functions which include the variance of idiosyncratic shocks from a second-stage
state equation, and which then serve as the terminal salvage functions for the first-stage problem.
3 Theory
3.1 Additive transformations
Consider the class of deterministic optimal control problems with M control and N state vari-
ables defined by:
V (T,β)
def
=
max
u(·),x(0),x(T )
{∫ T
0
[f (t,x(t),u(t)) + ϕ] e−rtdt+ e−rT [S1(x(T )) + ϕT ] + [S0(x(0)) + ϕ0]
}(1)
s. t. x˙(t) = g(t,x(t),u(t)), (2)
where T ∈ R++ is the terminal time of the planning horizon, assumed fixed in problem (1),
u(t) ∈ RM is the value of the control vector at time t, x(t) ∈ RN is the value of the state vector
at time t, g(·) def= (g1(·), g2(·), . . . , gN(·))′, r ∈ R++ is a discount rate and β
def
= (ϕ, ϕ0, ϕT , r).
The parameters ϕ ∈ R, ϕ0 ∈ R and ϕT ∈ R represent additive transformations to the functions
f(·), S0(·) and S1(·), respectively. In models of the firm, where f(·) can be thought of as
profit flow and S0(·) and S1(·) as salvage value functions, ϕ < 0 could be a flow of sunk fixed
costs incurred at every instant of the planning horizon, ϕ0 < 0 and ϕT < 0 could be the one-
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time sunk fixed costs incurred at the initial time and terminal time, respectively. Positive values
could be, respectively, flows of a subsidy, a start-up grant and a grant to incentivize cessation of
trading. In models of the consumer, f(·) could be an instantaneous utility function and ϕ < 0 the
instantaneous disutility of employment (as in Prettner and Canning 2014). In the lifecycle model
of retirement contemplated in section 5.3, ϕT includes the variance of idiosyncratic shocks to
income that occur once the agent is retired. Observe that the initial value of the state vector, x(0),
as well its terminal value, x(T ), are decision variables in the above control problem. Several
common perturbations of this problem are considered in what follows.
As far as notation is concerned, the following more or less standard conventions are em-
ployed: (i) x(t), u(t) and the vector of costate variables λ(t) (defined below) are column vec-
tors; (ii) the derivative of a scalar-valued function with respect to a column vector is a row vector;
(iii) the derivative of a vector-valued function with respect to a vector is a Jacobian matrix, with
number of rows equal to the number of functions being differentiated and number of columns
equal to the number of elements in the vector that the derivative is taken with respect to; (iv) the
Hessian matrix of a scalar-valued function is indicated by two subscripts on the said function,
the order of which is P ×Q, where P is the order of the first subscript and Q the second, and (v)
the symbol ‘ ′ ’ denotes transposition.
The ensuing assumptions are imposed on the optimal control problem defined by Eqs. (1)
and (2) and its variants, and are explained subsequently:
(A1) The functions f(·) : R×RN ×RM → R and gn(·) : R×RN ×RM → R, n = 1, 2, . . . , N ,
are C(0) in t and C(1) in (x,u) on their domains.
(A2) The functions S0(·) : RN → R and S1(·) : RN → R are C(2) on their domains.
(A3) There exists a C(1) optimal solution to each of the control problems below for all values of
the parameters in some open set.
(A4) The optimal value functions in each of the control problems below are locally C(2).
The assumed differentiability in assumptions (A1) and (A2) is useful in simplifying the expo-
sition, as it permits the use of the differential calculus in stating the necessary conditions. These
assumptions also help focus attention on the economic content of the results rather than on math-
ematical technicalities. In addition, the smoothness suppositions in (A2) and (A4) are necessary
because a differential comparative statics analysis is carried out. Given that the class of optimal
control problems under consideration is quite general, assumption (A3) is natural. Alternatively,
one could assume that certain curvature conditions hold on the underlying functions in order to
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invoke a sufficiency theorem. In the important case when the terminal time is a decision variable,
the sufficiency conditions are rather involved, as can be seen in Theorem 6.17 of Seierstad and
Sydsæter (1987). In any case, the problem with such an approach is that it imposes conditions on
the control problem that go beyond those needed for the discovery of intrinsic results, and hence
is avoided by employing assumption (A3).
Define the present-value Hamiltonian as:
H(t,x,u,λ)
def
= [ f( t, x, u ) + ϕ ] e−rt + λ′ g( t, x, u ), (3)
where λ ∈ RN is the present-value costate vector. Given assumptions (A1)–(A3) and the absence
of constraints in the control problem defined by Eqs. (1) and (2), it follows from Theorem 10.3
of Caputo (2005) that an optimal solution necessarily satisfies:
Hu(t,x,u,λ) = fu(t,x,u)e
−rt + λ′gu(t,x,u) = 0
′
M , (4a)
λ˙′ = −Hx(t,x,u,λ) = −fx(t,x,u)e
−rt − λ′gx(t,x,u), (4b)
x˙ = Hλ(t,x,u,λ)
′ = g(t,x,u), (4c)
λ(0)′ = −S0
x
(x(0)), (4d)
λ(T )′ = e−rTS1
x
(x(T )), (4e)
where 0M is the null column vector in RM . Because (ϕ, ϕ0, ϕT ) do not enter Eqs. (4a)–(4e),
optimal time-paths for the state, control and costate variables in the problem defined by Eqs.
(1) and (2) do not depend on (ϕ, ϕ0, ϕT ). This conclusion can also be deduced by rewriting the
objective functional in Eq. (1) in the equivalent form
∫ T
0
[f(t,x(t),u(t))] e−rtdt + ϕr−1[1− e−rT ] + e−rT
[
S1(x(T )) + ϕT
]
+
[
S0(x(0)) + ϕ0
]
. (5)
Eq. (5) shows that (ϕ, ϕ0, ϕT ) do not interact with the state vector, control vector, or the initial
and terminal values of the state vector. Hence an optimal solution to the problem defined by Eqs.
(1) and (2) cannot depend on (ϕ, ϕ0, ϕT ). Indeed, all (ϕ, ϕ0, ϕT ) do is change the value of V (·)
by ϕr−1[1− e−rT ] + ϕ0 + e−rTϕT . These results are summarized in the ensuing proposition.
Proposition 1 (Additive transformations do not matter) Under assumptions (A1) – (A3), an
optimal solution for (x(·),u(·)) and associated costate λ(·) of the control problem defined by
Eqs. (1) and (2) is independent of (ϕ, ϕ0, ϕT ), while the value of the optimal value function V (·)
is changed by the fixed amount ϕr−1[1− e−rT ] + ϕ0 + e−rTϕT .
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The economic interpretation of Proposition 1 is straightforward. Consider it in the context of
the theory of a firm, where the control vector consists of variable inputs and investment rates in
the capital stocks, and the capital stocks are represented by the state variables. Sunk fixed costs
are represented by ϕ ∈ R−, ϕ0 ∈ R− andϕT ∈ R−, as noted earlier. Proposition 1 asserts that
the optimal time-paths of the inputs, investment rates, the capital stocks and their shadow prices
are not affected by any of these three forms of sunk fixed costs. Indeed, the only thing affected
by sunk fixed costs is the firm’s wealth. Note that these results are the intertemporal analogue to
the prototypical result discussed in section 2, scilicet, an atemporal profit-maximizing firm’s rate
of output is independent of its sunk fixed costs once it has decided to produce.
Proposition 1 continues to hold under common alternative specifications. For example, if the
initial value of the state vector x(0) is fixed at x0, that is, x(0) = x0, and the terminal value of
the state vector x(T ) is similarly fixed at xT , that is, x(T ) = xT , then by Theorem 6.1 of Caputo
(2005), the necessary transversality conditions (4d) and (4e) are replaced by x(0) = x0 and
x(T ) = xT , respectively. As x(0) = x0 and x(T ) = xT are independent of (ϕ, ϕ0, ϕT ), just like
the transversality condition in Eqs. (4d) and (4e), Proposition 1 is unaffected. This conclusion
also holds if either x(0) = x0 or x(T ) = xT holds, for the reason just provided.
Now consider the case in which the planning horizon is infinite in length, that is, T → +∞,
thereby implying that S1(·) ≡ 0 and ϕT ≡ 0. The terminal conditions on the state variables
in this case are taken to be limt→+∞ xi(t) = xsi , i = 1, 2, . . . , n1, limt→+∞ xi(t) ≥ xsi , i =
n1 + 1, . . . , n2, and no conditions on xi(t) as t → +∞, i = n2 + 1, . . . , N . By Theorem 14.3
of Caputo (2005), the necessary conditions are still given by Eqs. (4a)–(4d), while the necessary
transversality condition (4e) no longer applies, nor do any, in general. Nonetheless, the applicable
necessary conditions remain independent of (ϕ, ϕ0) and hence Proposition 1 continues to hold.
What is more, the same conclusion holds whether or not x(0) is free or fixed at x0, as noted in
the preceding paragraph. As these results are sufficiently important, and will be referred to later,
they are recorded in the following corollary.
Corollary 1 Under assumptions (A1)–(A3), the conclusions of Proposition 1 continue to hold
for the optimal control problem defined by Eqs. (1) and (2) if either of the following changes are
made:
1. either or both of the initial and terminal values of the state vector are fixed, or,
2. the planning horizon is infinite in length, that is, T → +∞, the terminal conditions on
the state variables are limt→+∞ xi(t) = xsi , i = 1, 2, . . . , n1, limt→+∞ xi(t) ≥ xsi , i =
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n1 + 1, . . . , n2, and no conditions on xi(t) as t→ +∞, i = n2 + 1, . . . , N , and the initial
value of the state vector is free or fixed.
Consider now the version of the control problem given by Eqs. (1) and (2) in which the ter-
minal time of the planning horizon, T , is a decision variable
V ∗(β)
def
=
max
u(·),x(0),x(T ),T
{∫ T
0
[f (t,x(t),u(t)) + ϕ] e−rtdt+ e−rT [S1(x(T )) + ϕT ] + [S0(x(0)) + ϕ0]
}
,
(6)
subject to Eq. (2). By Theorem 10.3 of Caputo (2005), assuming that T > 0, the necessary con-
ditions for problem (6) subject to Eq. (2) comprise Eqs. (4a)–(4e) together with the transversality
condition H (T,x(T ),u(T ),λ(T )) − re−rT [S1 (x(T )) + ϕT ] = 0. The latter may be equiva-
lently written as
[f(T, x(T ), u(T )) + ϕ ] e−rT + λ(T )′ g( T, x(T ), u(T ) )− re−rT
[
S1(x(T )) + ϕT
]
= 0. (7)
Because Eq. (7) is a function of (ϕ, ϕT ), so too is an optimal solution for the state, control and
corresponding costate variables, together with the terminal time, of problem (6). This conclusion
also follows directly from Eq. (5) when T is a decision variable, seeing as (ϕ, ϕT ) interact with
T . The parameter ϕ0, however, does not appear in the necessary conditions in this case, and so
an optimal solution of problem (6) is not a function of ϕ0. The ensuing proposition summarizes
these facts.
Proposition 2 (Additive transformations matter - free terminal time) Under assumptions
(A1)–(A3), an optimal solution for (x(·),u(·)) and associated costate λ(·) of the control problem
defined by Eqs. (6) and (2) is a function of (ϕ, ϕT ) but not ϕ0, as is the optimal length of the
planning horizon. The optimal value function V ∗(·) is a function of (ϕ, ϕ0, ϕT ).
The economic interpretation of Proposition 2 is again straightforward. Continuing the ex-
ample of the theory of a firm, it asserts that a flow of sunk fixed costs ϕ, and a one-time sunk
termination cost ϕT , affect the optimal time-paths of the variable inputs, investment rates, the
capital stocks, the present value shadow prices of the capital stocks, as well as the time at which
the firm shuts down, assuming that it is optimal for the firm to be in business, i.e., that the opti-
mal value of T is positive. These results stand in stark contrast to the archetypal result discussed
in section 2, namely, that if a price-taking, atemporal, profit-maximizing firm has decided to
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operate, sunk fixed costs do not affect its production or shut-down decisions. Fully akin to the
prototypical case, sunk start-up costs ϕ0 do not affect the input or output decisions made by a
wealth-maximizing firm, nor when to shut down.
As was the case for Proposition 1, Proposition 2 also holds under a common perturbation of
problem (6), as summarized by the following corollary.
Corollary 2 Under assumptions (A1)–(A3), the conclusions of Proposition 2 continue to hold
for the control problem defined by Eqs. (6) and (2) whether or not the initial or terminal values
of the state vector are fixed or free.
To confirm the veracity of Corollary 2, note that the necessary transversality condition given
in Eq. (7) continues to be a necessary condition whether or not the initial and terminal values
of the state vector are fixed or free, seeing as T is still a decision variable. Because Eq. (7) is a
function of (ϕ, ϕT ), but not ϕ0, the result follows.
In order to provide a comprehensive account of the conditions under which additive transfor-
mations matter, it is worthwhile to end this section with a compact discussion of another situation
in which they do. Thus far it has been shown that ϕ and ϕT matter when the terminal time is a
decision variable. It is therefore natural to consider a symmetric situation, viz., that in which the
initial time, say t0, is a decision variable but the terminal time T is fixed. In this case, t0 replaces
0 as the lower limit of integration in Eq. (1), exp [−r(t− t0)] becomes the discount factor and
the terminal salvage value is given by exp [−r(T − t0)] [S1(x(T )) + ϕT ]. By Theorem 10.3 of
Caputo (2005), a necessary transversality condition is that the present value Hamiltonian eval-
uated at t0 equals r exp [−r(T − t0)] [S1(x(T )) + ϕT ]. But as (ϕ, ϕT ) appear in this necessary
condition whereas ϕ0 does not, it follows that an optimal solution for (x(·),u(·)) and associated
costate λ(·) of the corresponding optimal control problem are functions of (ϕ, ϕT ) but not ϕ0,
as is the optimal value of t0. Moreover, because the present value Hamiltonian and the terminal
salvage value function are part of the necessary transversality condition when the initial time,
terminal time, or both, are decision variables, and whether or not the initial and terminal values
of the state vector are free or fixed, the ensuing result holds.
Proposition 3 (Additive transformations matter - free initial time) Under assumptions (A1)–
(A3), if the initial time, terminal time, or both, are decision variables in the optimal control prob-
lem defined by Eqs. (1) and (2), then an optimal solution for (x(·),u(·)) and associated costate
λ(·) is a function of (ϕ, ϕT ) but not ϕ0, as are the optimal initial and terminal values of time,
whether or not the initial and terminal values of the state vector are fixed or free.
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3.2 Comparative statics of additive transformations
This section derives the comparative statics of the optimal values of the terminal time and the
initial and terminal values of the state vector of problem (6) using the two-stage approach of
Caputo and Wilen (1995).
Denote the optimal values of T , x0 and xT in problem (6) as (T ∗(β),x∗0(β),x∗T (β)). The
fixed endpoints and fixed time horizon optimal control problem corresponding to problem (6) is
Vˆ (T,x0,xT , ϕ, r)
def
= max
u(·)
∫ T
0
[f (t,x(t),u(t)) + ϕ] e−rtdt, (8)
subject to Eq. (2), x(0) = x0 and x(T ) = xT . By Corollary 1, a solution of problem (8)
is not a function of (ϕ, ϕ0, ϕT ). Furthermore, Vˆ (·) does not depend on (ϕ0, ϕT ), as is clear
from inspection of problem (8). Note that problem (8) is identical to problem (6) – the problem
of interest – save for the facts that: (i) (T,x0,xT ) are parameters in problem (8) but decision
variables in problem (6) and (ii) the expressions [S0(x0)+ϕ0] and e−rT [S1(xT )+ϕT ] are absent
in problem (8). As a result, the optimal value functions of problems (6) and (8) are related to
each other by way of the second-stage static maximization problem:
V ∗(β) = max
T,x0,xT
{
Vˆ (T,x0,xT , ϕ, r) + e
−rT [S1(xT ) + ϕT ] + [S
0(x0) + ϕ0]
}
, (9)
where a solution of problem (9) is denoted by (T ∗(β),x∗0(β),x∗T (β)), the aforementioned opti-
mal values of the terminal time, initial state vector and terminal state vector in problem (6).
The first-order necessary conditions obeyed by (T ∗(β),x∗0(β),x∗T (β)) are:
VˆT (T,x0,xT , ϕ, r)− re
−rT [S1(xT ) + ϕT ] = 0, (10a)
Vˆx0(T,x0,xT , ϕ, r) + S
0
x0
(x0) = 0
′
N , (10b)
VˆxT (T,x0,xT , ϕ, r) + e
−rTS1
xT
(xT ) = 0
′
N . (10c)
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The second-order sufficient condition requires that the (2N + 1)× (2N + 1) Hessian matrix
H
def
=


VˆTT + r
2e−rT [S1 + ϕT ] VˆTx0 VˆTxT − re
−rTS1
xT
1 × 1 1 × N 1 × N
Vˆx0T Vˆx0x0 + S
0
x0x0
Vˆx0xT
N × 1 N × N N × N
VˆxT T − re
−rT (S1
xT
)′ VˆxTx0 VˆxTxT + e
−rTS1
xTxT
N × 1 N × N N × N


(11)
is negative definite when evaluated at (T,x0,xT ) = (T ∗(β),x∗0(β),x∗T (β)).
To conduct the comparative statics analysis, substitute (T ∗(β),x∗0(β),x∗T (β)) into Eqs. (10a)–
(10c) and differentiate the resulting identities with respect to, say, ϕ, to get
H∗


∂T ∗(β)/∂ϕ
1 × 1
∂x∗0(β)/∂ϕ
N × 1
∂x∗T (β)/∂ϕ
N × 1


≡


−VˆTϕ
1 × 1
−Vˆx0ϕ
N × 1
−VˆxTϕ
N × 1


, (12)
where H∗ is the Hessian matrix in Eq. (11) evaluated at (T ∗(β),x∗0(β),x∗T (β)). By Theorem
9.1 of Caputo (2005), a dynamic envelope result,
Vˆϕ(T,x0,xT , ϕ, r) =
∫ T
0
e−rtdt = 1
r
[1− e−rT ], (13)
from which follow VˆϕT = e−rT = VˆTϕ, Vˆϕx0 ≡ 0′N ≡ Vˆ ′x0ϕ and VˆϕxT ≡ 0′N ≡ Vˆ ′xTϕ, using
assumption (A4). Using these results and Cramer’s Rule in Eq. (12), one has
∂T ∗(β)
∂ϕ
≡ −e−rT
∣∣∣∣∣ Vˆx0x0 + S
0
x0x0
Vˆx0xT
VˆxTx0 VˆxTxT + e
−rTS1
xTxT
∣∣∣∣∣
|H∗|
> 0. (14)
The sign of Eq. (14) follows from the facts that: (i) H∗ is negative definite by the second-order
sufficient condition; (ii) the determinant in the numerator is a leading principal minor, and (iii)
the order of the leading principal minor is one less than that of |H∗|, thereby implying that the
leading principal minor and |H∗| have opposite signs.
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The comparative statics result in Eq. (14) applies to the general class of optimal control
problems defined by Eqs. (6) and (2), and is therefore independent of functional form, mono-
tonicity and curvature assumptions made on f(·) and g(·), seeing as none were made. Indeed,
its sign follows solely from the second-order sufficient condition for problem (9) and the manner
in which ϕ enters the control problem. As a result, the comparative statics result in Eq. (14) is
intrinsic to the aforesaid class of problems. Eq. (14) demonstrates that, for the case of ϕ > 0,
which could apply if the firm receives a flow of subsidy, the higher is ϕ, the later the firm shuts
down. Similarly, for the case of sunk fixed costs (ϕ < 0), the greater they are, the sooner the firm
shuts down.
At the present level of generality, there are no refutable comparative statics results for the
initial or terminal values of the state vector. To see this, note that if one were to calculate, say,
∂x∗T i(β)/∂ϕ, the numerator would include a cofactor which is not a principal minor, the sign of
which is not prescribed by the second-order sufficient condition. Consequently, the effect of a
change in the flow of fixed subsidies or sunk fixed costs on an optimal solution of problem (6)
cannot be determined unambiguously either. Indeed, as is demonstrated in section 5, even in a
stylized version of the adjustment cost model of a firm, one cannot obtain an unambiguous result
for the effect of a change in ϕ on the terminal capital stock.
Consider now the case of ϕ0. By Proposition 2, the solution (T ∗(β),x∗0(β),x∗T (β)) is not a
function of ϕ0. Hence it follows that ∂T ∗(β)/∂ϕ0 ≡ 0, ∂x∗0(β)/∂ϕ0 ≡ 0N , and ∂x∗T (β)/∂ϕ0 ≡
0N .
Finally, consider the comparative statics of ϕT . As before, differentiate the identity form of
Eqs. (10a)–(10c) with respect to ϕT to get
H∗


∂T ∗(β)/∂ϕT
∂x∗0(β)/∂ϕT
∂x∗T (β)/∂ϕT

 ≡


re−rT
0N
0N

 . (15)
Applying Cramer’s rule to Eq. (15) yields:
∂T ∗(β)
∂ϕT
≡ re−rT
∣∣∣∣∣ Vˆx0x0 + S
0
x0x0
Vˆx0xT
VˆxTx0 VˆxTxT + e
−rTS1
xTxT
∣∣∣∣∣
|H∗|
< 0, (16)
where the inequality in Eq. (16) follows from the same considerations as those used to estab-
lish the inequality in Eq. (14). Eq. (16) asserts that, for an increase in ϕT when ϕT > 0,
which would be the case of a payment to the firm upon shutting down, the firm shuts down
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sooner. In a similar manner, if ϕT < 0, which would be the case in which the firm pays, say,
a decommissioning cost upon shutting down, an increase in this cost would cause the firm to
shut-down later. These are exactly the opposite of the effects of changes in ϕ. Observe that an
increase in sunk termination fixed costs occurs at the date the firm shuts down and is discounted.
Hence it pays the firm to delay shutting down when such costs increase, because delaying low-
ers their present discounted value. Moreover, inspection of Eqs. (14) and (16) reveals that
∂T ∗(β)/∂ϕT ≡ −r[∂T
∗(β)/∂ϕ] < 0, which is consistent with the fact that ϕ is a flow incurred
at every point in time of the planning horizon and ϕT is a one-time incurred stock. Note, in
passing, that the effect of an increase in ϕT on the initial or terminal state vectors is ambiguous,
in general, for the reason given two paragraphs above.
The preceding results are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 Under assumptions (A1)–(A4), and assuming that the second-order sufficient
condition holds in problem (9), the following comparative statics results hold for the optimal
control problem defined by Eqs. (6) and (2):
1. ∂T ∗(β)/∂ϕ > 0, ∂x∗0(β)/∂ϕ ≷ 0N , ∂x∗T (β)/∂ϕ ≷ 0N ,
2. ∂T ∗(β)/∂ϕ0 ≡ 0, ∂x∗0(β)/∂ϕ0 ≡ 0N , ∂x∗T (β)/∂ϕ0 ≡ 0N ,
3. ∂T ∗(β)/∂ϕT ≡ −r[∂T ∗(β)/∂ϕ] < 0, ∂x∗0(β)/∂ϕT ≷ 0N , ∂x∗T (β)/∂ϕT ≷ 0N .
Note that Proposition 4, appropriately modified, continues to hold if either the initial value of the
state vector, terminal value of the state vector, or both, are fixed in problem (6), as long as the
second-order sufficient condition in the corresponding version of problem (9) holds. Finally, it is
worth mentioning again that the preceding results can be applied to the literature cited in sections
1 and 2, seeing as the second-stage value function serves as the terminal salvage function in the
regime-switching literature.
4 Stochastic extensions
Tomiyama (1985) and Makris (2001) showed how deterministic, two-stage optimal control prob-
lems with an endogenous switching time can be handled using standard optimal control tech-
niques. This section shows how to extend the comparative statics results of section 3 to this
two-stage framework for two common classes of stochastic control problems, thereby permitting
the determination of the comparative statics effect of a change in the volatility of the second-stage
process on the optimal switching time.
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Begin by considering the following class of current value autonomous, infinite horizon, two-
stage, stochastic optimal control problems:
max
u(·),xT ,T
E0
{∫ T
0
f (t, x(t),u(t)) e−rtdt+ e−rT
∫
∞
T
[α ln x(t) + β ln u(t)]e−r(t−T )dt
}
(17)
s. t. x˙(t) = g(t, x(t),u(t)), x(0) = x0, t ∈ [0, T ],
dx(t) = [ax(t) + bu(t)]dt+ σx(t)dZ(t), x(T ) = xT , t ∈ (T,+∞),
where E0 is the conditional expectation operator at time zero, (a, b, α, β, σ) are parameters, with
b 6= 0, β 6= 0 and σ > 0, u(t) is any one of the control variables that comprise the control vector
u(t) ∈ RM , T > 0 is the switching time, Z(t) is standard Brownian motion, and all other terms
are as defined earlier.
Given admissible values of (xT , T ), the second-stage stochastic optimal control problem cor-
responding to problem (17) is
V2(xT )
def
= max
u(·)
ET
{∫
∞
T
[α ln x(t) + β ln u(t)]e−r(t−T )dt
}
, (18)
s. t. dx(t) = [ax(t) + bu(t)]dt + σx(t)dZ(t), x(T ) = xT .
For notational simplicity, the stage-two current value function, V2(·), is expressed only as a
function of the state variable. As is well-known, the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation
corresponding to problem (18) is:
rV2(x) = max
u
{
α ln x+ β ln u+ V ′2(x)[ax+ bu] +
1
2
σ2x2V ′′2 (x)
}
. (19)
The determination of a function V2(·) such that Eq. (19) holds is essential for extending a com-
parative statics result of section 3, seeing as V2(·) serves as the terminal salvage function for
the class of stochastic control problems defined by Eq. (17) et seq. by way of the backwards
induction argument. It is therefore worthwhile to pause at this juncture in order to attain a better
understanding of the functional form of V2(·) that is necessary for the said extension.
In order to extend the comparative statics result of Proposition 4, part 3, to the class of
stochastic optimal control problems defined by Eq. (17) et seq., the terminal salvage function
must comprise a function of the state variable at the switching time, plus a constant. This follows
from inspection of Eq. (6). But, as remarked above, the terminal salvage function for this class
of problems is given by V2(·). Moreover, for σ2 to appear as part of the additive constant of
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V2(·) and not part of the function that depends on the state variable, Eq. (19) shows that the
differential equation x2V ′′2 (x) = −A must be satisfied, where A is a constant that is independent
of x. Integrating x2V ′′2 (x) = −A twice yields its general solution, namely
V2(x) = A lnx+Bx+ C, (20)
where B and C are also constants independent of x. As a result, in order to have σ2 appear as
part of the additive constant of the terminal salvage function, V2(·) must be of the form given in
Eq. (20). Finally, observe that Eq. (20) also suggests that the natural logarithms of the state and
control variables should be included in the integrand of the second-stage problem, just as they
are in Eq. (18).
Given the preceding deductions, it may be shown that there exist constants A, B and C such
that V2(·) as defined in Eq. (20) is a solution of Eq. (19). The proofs of the following two
propositions are contained in the Appendix.
Proposition 5 For the class of stochastic optimal control problems defined by Eq. (17) et seq.,
the second-stage current value function V2(·) is as defined in Eq. (20), where A = r−1(α + β),
B = 0 and C = r−1β[ln[−b−1rβ(α+ β)−1]− 1] + r−2(α+ β)(a− 1
2
σ2), and where β > 0 and
b(α + β) < 0. Moreover, sign[∂T ∗/∂σ2] = sign[α + β].
The inequality β > 0 is an implication of the assumption β 6= 0 and the second-order
necessary condition of the maximization problem in Eq. (19), while b(α + β) < 0 is equivalent
to the fact that the control variable must be positive for the integrand of problem (18) to be well
defined. The latter inequality leads to two separate cases, which are taken up in turn.
For the first case, let b > 0. This implies that α+β < 0, which can only hold if α < 0, seeing
as β > 0. But α + β < 0 implies that A < 0, V ′2(x) < 0 and V ′′2 (x) > 0. The state variable is
therefore a ‘bad’, as V ′2(x) < 0. This case therefore characterizes stochastic control problems in
which the state variable is a stock of pollution, waste, or a bad habit or addiction. Notice too that
the control variable contributes to the accumulation of the bad stock in this case (b > 0) and, as
a result, it could represent a firm’s rate of output or production, or an individual’s or economy’s
rate of consumption.
The most important part of Proposition 5 is the comparative statics result for the switching
time. In interpreting it, first note that the variance of the instantaneous change in the state vari-
able is σ2[x(t)]2 in problem (17). Moreover, because α + β < 0 under the present stipulation,
∂T ∗/∂σ2 < 0. That is, the optimal time to switch to the second stage decreases as the variance
of the instantaneous change in the state variable increases. In other words, as the variability of
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the change in the bad stock in the second stage increases, the decision maker finds it optimal to
switch to the second stage sooner. The corresponding economic intuition is compelling. Because
V2(·) is strictly convex in the state variable, or equivalently, because the decision maker is a risk
lover with respect to the state variable, the decision maker is willing to take their chances by
switching to the second stage – the risky environment – sooner. Hence the seemingly counterin-
tuitive comparative statics result is made intuitive by appealing to the implied risk preferences of
the decision maker.
In the second case, let b < 0, which implies that α + β > 0 and, in turn, that A > 0,
V ′2(x) > 0, and V ′′2 (x) < 0. In contrast to the preceding case, the stock is now a ‘good’ because
V ′2(x) > 0 and the decision maker is risk averse with respect to the state variable in view of
the fact that V ′′2 (x) < 0. This case therefore characterizes stochastic control problems in which
the state variable is a beneficial asset, such as a stock of wealth or a nonrenewable or renewable
resource. Inasmuch as the control variable contributes to the reduction of the good stock, it could
represent a firm’s rate of consumption spending out of wealth, or a firm’s rate of nonrenewable
resource extraction or rate of harvest of a renewable resource. Also supporting the notion that the
present case is the opposite of the previous is the fact that the optimal switching time increases as
the variance of the instantaneous change in the state variable during the second stage increases,
i.e., ∂T ∗/∂σ2 > 0. The intuition here is essentially the same as in the prior case, in that the
decision maker is now risk averse and finds it optimal to delay switching to the second stage,
where accumulation of the good stock has a risky component.
Having addressed the first class of stochastic control problems in some detail, the second
class will be given a more crisp treatment. The second class is given by the following problem:
max
u(·),xT ,T
E0
{∫ T
0
f (t, x(t),u(t)) e−rtdt
+ e−rT
∫ +∞
T
[
α1x(t)−
1
2
α2[x(t)]
2 + β1u(t)−
1
2
β2[u(t)]
2
]
e−r(t−T )dt
} (21)
s. t. x˙(t) = g(t, x(t),u(t)), x(0) = x0, t ∈ [0, T ],
dx(t) = [ax(t) + bu(t)]dt+ σdZ(t), x(T ) = xT , t ∈ (T,+∞),
where (α1, α2, β1, β2) are parameters with β2 6= 0, and all the remaining terms are as defined in
problem (17). There are two differences between problems (17) and (21). First, the integrand in
the second stage of problem (21) is a linear-quadratic function of the state and control variables,
whereas it is an additive and natural logarithmic function in problem (17). Second, the stochastic
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state equation in problem (21) assumes the variance of the diffusion is the constant σ2, while in
problem (17) it is a function of the square of the state variable, namely, σ2[x(t)]2.
Given admissible values of (xT , T ), the second-stage stochastic optimal control problem cor-
responding to problem (21) is:
V2(xT )
def
= max
u(·)
ET
[∫ +∞
T
(
α1x(t)−
1
2
α2[x(t)]
2 + β1u(t)−
1
2
β2[u(t)]
2
)
e−r(t−T )dt
]
, (22)
s.t. dx(t) = [ax(t) + bu(t)]dt+ σdZ(t), x(T ) = xT ,
and the corresponding HJB equation is
rV2(x) = max
u
{
α1x−
1
2
α2x
2 + β1u−
1
2
β2u
2 + V ′2(x)[ax+ bu] +
1
2
σ2V ′′2 (x)
}
. (23)
Using the logic enunciated above in the conjecture for the second-stage current value function of
problem (17), it follows that
V2(x) =
1
2
Ax2 + Bx+ C (24)
is the conjecture for V2(·), where A, B and C are constants to be determined. The following
result is the analogue of Proposition 5 for this class of problems.
Proposition 6 For the class of stochastic optimal control problems defined by Eq. (21) et seq.,
the second-stage current value function V2(·) is given by Eq. (24), where:
A =
−(2a− r)b−2β2 ±
√
(2a− r)2b−4β22 + 4α2b
−2β2
2
, (25a)
B =
α1 + bβ1β
−1
2 A
r − a− b2β−12 A
, (25b)
C = r−1
(
1
2
β21β
−1
2 +
1
2
b2β−12 B
2 + bβ1β
−1
2 B +
1
2
σ2A
)
, (25c)
and where β2 > 0 and β1 + bB + bAx ≥ 0. Moreover, sign[∂T ∗/∂σ2] = −sign[A].
Proposition 6 demonstrates that the linear-quadratic integrand in the second stage leads to a
considerably more complex solution for the constants than did the first case. Nonetheless, the
comparative statics result shows that the effect of an increase in the variance of the instantaneous
change in the state variable on the optimal switching time is wholly determined by the sign of
the constant A. But the value of A also completely determines the curvature of the second stage
17
current value function, as V ′′2 (x) = A. Thus, as was the case in Proposition 5, the implied risk
preferences of the decision maker fully determine the effect of an increase in the variance of the
instantaneous change in the state variable on the optimal switching time – if the decision maker
is risk averse, it is optimal to switch to the risky stage later; if risk loving, it is optimal to switch
sooner.
This section is brought to a close by demonstrating the reach of Propositions 5 and 6. To
begin, observe that the propositions are more general than they might appear at first glance. This
is because the first-stage optimal control problems to which they pertain, defined in Eqs. (17)
and (21), leave the integrands and state equations in a general form and account for multiple
control variables. Moreover, the first-stage control problem can be further generalized to allow
for multiple state variables without changing the content of Propositions 5 and 6. Only in the
second stage do the integrands and state equations have to be of a specific functional form to
make use of the propositions. Finally, Proposition 6 applies to the workhorse class of stochastic
optimal control problems, namely, the linear-quadratic class. This fact speaks directly to the
reach of Proposition 6.
5 Applications
This section presents three applications of the foregoing theory and considers some other fruitful
areas for application in section 5.4.
5.1 The adjustment cost model of a firm
The adjustment cost model under consideration takes the form
max
u(·),T,x(T )
{∫ T
0
[π(x(t), u(t))− φ]e−rtdt+ e−rTS(x(T ))
}
, (26)
s. t. x˙(t) = u(t)− δx(t), x(0) = x0,
where u(t) is the rate of investment in the firm’s capital stock x(t) > 0 at time t, r > 0 is the
discount rate, δ > 0 is the rate of depreciation of the capital stock, and φ > 0 is the flow of
sunk fixed costs. Let π(x, u) =def x − 0.5u2 be the flow of total revenue less costs of adjustment,
and S(x) =def θx, θ > 0, be the salvage value of the capital stock. These functional forms
were chosen because they satisfy the typical assumptions employed in such models and because
they contribute to maintaining the focus on matters of economics rather than on mathematical
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technicalities. Note that sunk start-up fixed costs can be ignored (by Proposition 3) and that sunk
termination fixed costs have the opposite effect of the flow of sunk fixed costs on the shut down
decision (by Proposition 4) and so can be ignored as well.
The necessary conditions are given by Eqs. (4a)-(4c) and (4e), with the transversality con-
dition in Eq. (4d) replaced by the initial condition on the capital stock, together with Eq. (7).
They can be reduced to the following pair of ordinary differential equations, initial and terminal
conditions and transversality conditions by way of standard, and thus omitted, manipulations:
x˙(t) = u(t)− δx(t), x(0) = x0, (27a)
u˙(t) = u(t)[r + δ]− 1, u(T ) = θ, (27b)
x(T )− 0.5[u(T )]2 − φ+ θu(T )− θx(T )[r + δ] = 0. (27c)
The phase diagram corresponding to Eqs. (27a) and (27b) is straightforward to derive. The
difficulty lies in determining how Eq. (27c), which implicitly defines a curve relating u(T ) to
x(T ), appears in the phase diagram. This determination is crucial, as an optimal solution to the
adjustment cost model must terminate in the phase diagram where the horizontal line u(T ) = θ
intersects the curve implicitly defined by Eq. (27c). Denote the steady state value of the capital
stock and investment rate as (xss, uss) def= (δ−1(r+δ)−1, [r+δ]−1) and note that both are positive.
Furthermore, define F (x, u) def= x − 0.5u2 + θu − θx[r + δ], so that Eq. (27c) can be written
compactly as F (x, u) = φ.
There are two possible configurations for the phase diagram corresponding to Eqs. (27a)-
(27c). Figure 1(a) corresponds to the case u(T ) > uss, that is, θ > [r + δ]−1, and Figure 1(b) to
the case u(T ) < uss. In what follows, details pertaining to Figure 1(a) are given.
First, derive an explicit expression for the terminal value of the capital stock. Given that
u(T ) = θ from Eq. (27b), Eq. (27c) can be solved for x(T ) to get
x(T ) =
φ− 0.5θ2
1− θ[r + δ]
. (28)
The case of interest is x(T ) > 0, which is maintained in what ensues. Because u(T ) > uss in the
present case, that is, θ > (r + δ)−1, the denominator in Eq. (28) is negative, hence φ < 0.5θ2. It
then follows that ∂x(T )/∂φ = 1/[1− θ(r+ δ)] < 0, that is, an increase in the flow of sunk fixed
costs decreases the capital stock the firm has on hand when it shuts down. Note that the opposite
is true in Figure 1(b), where u(T ) < uss holds, in view of the fact that θ < (r + δ)−1 then holds.
Next, note that by the implicit function theorem, the slope of the curve implicitly defined by
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x˙ = 0
u˙ = 0
1
r+δ
u(T ) = θθ
0 1
δ(r+δ)
x0 x0
L
H
⋄⋄ 
F (x, u) = φ2
F (x, u) = φ1
(a) θ > 1/(r + δ).
u
x
x˙ = 0
u(T ) = θθ
u˙ = 0
1
r+δ
0 1
δ(r+δ)
x0
⋄
F (x, u) = φ2
F (x, u) = φ1
(b) θ < 1/(r + δ)
Figure 1: Phase diagrams for the adjustment cost model of the firm
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F (x, u) = φ in the xu-plane is given by:
∂u
∂x
∣∣∣∣∣Eq.(27c) =
−Fx(x, u)
Fu(x, u)
∣∣∣∣∣
F (x,u)=φ
=
θ(r + δ)− 1
θ − u
{
< 0 iff u > θ
> 0 iff u < θ
, (29)
as θ(r + δ) − 1 > 0 in the case under consideration. Eq.(29) also demonstrates that, as u → θ,
the slope of the curve implicitly defined by F (x, u) = φ becomes vertical. As a result, the curve
implicitly defined by the transversality condition F (x, u) = φ in Eq. (27c) and the horizontal
straight line determined by the endpoint condition u(T ) = θ in Eq. (27b) intersect orthogonally
at the optimal terminal time.
Finally, in order to complete the phase diagram, the curvature of the curve implicitly defined
by F (x, u) = φ must also be determined. The said curvature is found by partially differentiating
Eq. (29) with respect to u, remembering that u is a function of x along F (x, u) = φ via the
implicit function theorem:
∂2u
∂x2
∣∣∣∣∣
F (x,u)=φ
=
θ(r + δ)− 1
[θ − u]2
∂u
∂x
∣∣∣∣∣
F (x,u)=φ
{
< 0 iff u > θ
> 0 iff u < θ
. (30)
Thus, under the present assumptions, Eqs. (29) and (30) show that the curve implicitly defined by
F (x, u) = φ is increasing and strongly convex for all values of u below u(T ) = θ and decreasing
and strongly concave for all values of u above u(T ) = θ.
Putting the above information together yields Figure 1(a), where the curves F (x, u) = φ and
u(T ) = θ are shown intersecting in the northeast and northwest isosectors. Under the present
stipulations, a solution to the adjustment cost problem must lie exclusively in the northwest
isosector. To see this, recall that ∂x(T )/∂φ = 1/[1 − θ(r + δ)] < 0. Thus, as the flow of sunk
fixed costs increases, the point where the curves F (x, u) = φ and u(T ) = θ intersect moves to the
left. Define two fixed costs, φ1 and φ2, such that φ2 > φ1. The preceding implies that, for paths
originating in the northeast isosector of Figure 1(a), the trajectory corresponding to φ2, labeled
H , must lie below the trajectory corresponding to φ1, labeled L. Trajectory H therefore lies
closer to the stable manifold of the saddlepoint steady state – the u˙ = 0 isocline – implying that
it has a larger value of terminal time than trajectory L. Trajectories originating in the northeast
isosector therefore exhibit the property that, as the flow of sunk fixed costs increases, the terminal
time increases, which contradicts Proposition 4. As a result, a solution to problem (26) cannot
originate in the northeast isosector, that is, it must lie exclusively in the northwest isosector.
An optimal solution can now be qualitatively characterized using Figure 1(a). The double-
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lined trajectories correspond to the optimal time-paths of the capital stock and investment rate,
and are monotonically increasing functions of time. They show that, the higher the flow of sunk
fixed costs, the sooner the firm shuts down and the smaller is its capital stock when it does so.
Figure 1(b) shows the trajectories corresponding to a solution of the adjustment cost model
when u(T ) < uss. By Proposition 4, it remains the case that the optimal T is lower when the
flow of sunk fixed costs are higher, but in this case the terminal stock of capital increases when
the flow of sunk fixed costs increases, seeing as ∂x(T )/∂φ = 1/[1− θ(r + δ)] > 0. In contrast
to the case of Figure 1(a), the capital stock and investment trajectories lie exclusively in the
southeast isosector and are monotonically decreasing functions of time. Moreover, the analysis
shows that, in general, the terminal stock of capital may increase or decrease as the flow of sunk
fixed costs increases, thereby confirming that no general comparative statics result is available in
Proposition 4 for the terminal value of the state vector.
5.2 Optimal pollution accumulation with uncertainty over the critical pol-
lution threshold
Tahvonen and Withagen (1996) developed a deterministic model of optimal pollution accumu-
lation in which the pollution stock depreciates as long as it remains below a critical threshold.
If the stock passes the threshold, it no longer depreciates and is therefore deemed to be ‘irre-
versible’. The social planner is asserted to choose the rate of pollution-augmenting output over
an infinite planning horizon that is divided into two distinct stages: during the first stage, the
stock of pollution depreciates at a defined rate; during the second, upon reaching the threshold,
the rate of depreciation falls to zero. One focus in the model is on the choice of the optimal
timing of entry to the second stage.
A key assumption made by Tahvonen and Withagen is that the threshold at which the pollu-
tion stock becomes irreversible is known with certainty at the initial time of the planning horizon.
This assumption is relaxed here by instead assuming that, at the start of the planning horizon,
the social planner does not know the threshold at which the rate of depreciation of the pollution
stock falls to zero. The model is further generalized by leaving the stage one instantaneous utility
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function, U(·), in a general form. As a result, the planner solves:
max
y(·),T
E0
{∫ T
0
U(y(t), z(t))e−ρtdt+ (31a)
e−ρT
∫ +∞
T
(
−
1
2
α2[z(t)]
2 + β1y(t)−
1
2
β2[y(t)]
2
)
e−ρ(t−T )dt
}
,
s. t. z˙(t) = y(t)− αz(t), z(0) = z0, z(T ) = µZ + γZX, t ∈ [0, T ], (31b)
z˙(t) = y(t), t ∈ (T,+∞), (31c)
where y(t) is the rate of pollution-augmenting output, z(t) the stock of pollution and the Greek
letters are parameters, all of which are positive and X is a random variable with mean zero and
variance 1. The pollution stock at which irreversibility occurs is therefore a random variable
z(T ) from the perspective of t = 0, with mean µZ and variance γ2Z .
As in Tahvonen and Withagen, it is assumed that the planner knows the moment at which
irreversibility occurs. Hence, at the point at which the second stage is entered, the planner solves
the following deterministic control problem:
V2(zT ) = max
y(·)
∫ +∞
T
(
−
1
2
α2[z(t)]
2 + β1y(t)−
1
2
β2[y(t)]
2
)
e−ρ(t−T )dt, (32a)
s. t. z˙(t) = y(t), z(T ) = zT. (32b)
Noting that this is a deterministic version of problem (22), with α1 = 0, a = 0, b = 1 and σ = 0,
it follows from Proposition 6 that
V2(zT ) = A[zT ]
2 +BzT + C, (33)
where A, B and C are as defined in Eq. (25).
From the perspective of t = 0, the planner solves:
max
y(·),T
{∫ T
0
U(y(t), z(t))e−ρtdt
}
+ e−ρTE0[V2(z(T ))], (34)
s. t. z˙(t) = y(t)− αz(t), z(0) = z0, z(T ) = µZ + γZX,
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where, noting Eq. (33):
E0[V2(z(T ))] = E0[A(µ
2
Z + 2µZγZX + γ
2
ZX
2) +B(µZ + γZX) + C] = A(µ
2
Z + γ
2
Z) (35)
+BµZ + C.
As the values of the stock of pollution are not decision variables at t = 0 and t = T , upon
substituting E0[V2(Z(T ))] for [S1(xT ) + ψT ] in Eq. (10a), it alone determines the optimal
value of T . Hence, implicitly differentiating the resulting Eq. (10a) with respect to γ2Z yields
sign[∂T ∗/∂γ2Z ] = −sign[A]. Accordingly, for a risk averse planner, A < 0 and it is optimal to
extend the first stage of the planning horizon, while if a planner is a risk lover, then A > 0 and it
is optimal to enter the risky second stage earlier.
5.3 A lifecycle model of retirement with shocks to retirement income
This section applies Proposition 5 to extend Prettner and Canning’s (2014) lifecycle model of
retirement to establish the effect of idiosyncratic shocks to retirement income on the optimal
timing of retirement. The defining characteristic of the analysis is that the solution of the retire-
ment stage of the model yields a bequest function which is additive in the parameter governing
the variance of the idiosyncratic shocks.
Consider, therefore, the following generalization of Prettner and Canning’s control problem,
in which shocks to retirement income and a general utility function during working life are
postulated:
max
c(·),l(·),WT ,T
E0
{∫ T
0
U(c(t), l(t))e−ρ˜tdt + e−ρ˜T
∫ +∞
T
ln[c(t)]e−ρ˜(t−T )dt
}
, (36a)
s. t. W˙ (t) = wl(t) + r˜W (t)− c(t), W (0) = W0, t ∈ [0, T ], (36b)
dW (t) = [rW (t)− c(t)]dt+ σW (t)dZ(t), W (T ) = WT , t ∈ (T,+∞), (36c)
where W (t) is wealth, U(·) is a function of c(t), the rate of consumption, and l(t), the number
of hours worked per unit time during the agent’s working life, w > 0 the wage rate earned when
working, r > 0 the rate of growth of wealth (assumed to be the same whether the individual is
working or retired), Z(t) is standard Brownian motion and σ > 0. The effective discount and
interest rates faced by the individual, ρ˜ def= ρ + λ and r˜ def= r + λ include the constant mortality
risk λ > 0, implying that the probability of being alive at t is exp(−λt). This specification
represents a considerable generalization of Prettner and Canning’s problem, seeing as U(·) is left
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in a general form.
Inspection of problem (36a) shows that it is a special case of problem (17), where α = 0, β =
1, a = r and b = −1. It therefore follows from Proposition 5 that ∂T ∗/∂σ2 > 0, as α + β > 0.
That is, the presence of idiosyncratic shocks to retirement income unambiguously increases the
optimal retirement age. The second stage shocks have the effect of introducing risk into the
evolution of wealth during an agent’s retirement years, which the risk averse agent wishes to
delay.
5.4 Further applications
In closing section 5, we briefly review several other papers in addition to those just discussed and
those reviewed in sections 1 and 2, to which our results may be applied.
Consider first a pair of closely related papers by Caulkins et al. (2011, 2015). Each developed
an optimal control model of conspicuous product pricing by a firm when an economy is in a
recession that reduces demand and freezes credit markets, the latter extending the former by
allowing the firm to develop an optimal cash management strategy. In the case when the recession
lasts so long that the firm faces bankruptcy and therefore finds it optimal to shut down, the
terminal time is a decision variable and hence Corollary 2 and Proposition 4 apply. As a result,
in the case of an interior solution, a flow of sunk fixed costs affects the firm’s optimal price
trajectory and, moreover, it will shut down sooner if the flow of sunk fixed costs increases. These
results are intrinsic to the models, as they do not rely upon the functional form assumptions made
by Caulkins et al. (2011, 2015).
Proposition 4 can also be used to show that an increase in a fixed switching cost delays
the adoption decision in the Grass et al. (2012) two-stage optimal control model of technology
adoption with capital accumulation and technological progress. Then either Proposition 5 or
6 can be used to extend the model to determine the effect of an increase in the instantaneous
variance of the change in the post-adoption capital stock on the adoption decision when the
second-stage control problem has an infinite planning horizon. Indeed, these three propositions
can be applied just as readily to the two-stage optimal control models of workplace reorganization
of Vallee´ and Moreno-Galbis (2011) and closed- versus open-source software distribution of
Caulkins et al. (2013), to draw similar qualitative conclusions.
In a different application of two-stage optimal control theory, Bultmann et al. (2008a, 2008b)
modeled a country with a drug problem in which the drug’s supply is significantly disrupted for
some initial period of time, thereby causing price to be higher than usual. Later, price returns
to its usual level. The time at which price switches to its usual level is treated as a parameter in
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the model, so Propositions 1-6 do not apply. But in discussing possible extensions of the model,
Bultmann et al. (2008b) suggested that the switching time may be a decision variable as a result
of a deliberate policy choice by a government, in which case Corollary 2 and Proposition 4 apply
and Propositions 5 or 6 can be used to further extend the model and draw qualitative conclusions
akin to those just mentioned.
With the growing use of two-stage optimal control problems to model all kinds of economic
environments, as exemplified by Chapter 8 of Grass et al. (2008) and the applications contained
therein, the number of papers which can take advantage of our basic results might be expected to
increase in the coming years.
6 Concluding remarks
A framework for studying the impact of additive transformations to rewards for a general class
of deterministic, nonautonomous optimal control problems has been established and a full set of
comparative static results derived. The framework was then extended to two classes of stochas-
tic control problems, one of which was the workhorse linear-quadratic class. The reach of the
methods was demonstrated on three rather different optimal control problems and an economic
interpretation of the comparative statics calculations was provided.
When the planning horizon is fixed, neither the optimal time-paths of the control or state
variables, nor the latter’s corresponding shadow prices, are functions of additive flow, start-up,
or termination, sunk fixed costs or benefits. If, however, the initial or terminal time are decision
variables – not uncommon in economic theory – then optimal time-paths of the state, control and
costate variables, as well as the optimal initial and terminal times, are functions of additive flow
and termination sunk fixed costs or benefits, but not such start-up costs and benefits.
It is important to emphasize that the conclusions reached in section 3 are not due to any
special structure placed on the integrand and transition functions, and thus represent intrinsic
behavior of optimizing agents. Similarly, even though the second-stage integrand and transition
functions must be of certain forms in the stochastic case, their first-stage counterparts were left
in general form and could accommodate multiple state and control variables, thereby pointing to
the generality of the results, even in the stochastic setting.
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Appendix: Proofs of Propositions 5 and 6
Proof of Proposition 5. The first-order necessary condition of the maximization problem in
Eq. (19) gives u = −βb−1[V ′2(x)]−1 > 0, the strict inequality following from the fact that the
domain of the natural logarithm function is (0,+∞). The second-order necessary condition is
−βu−2 ≤ 0, which is equivalent to β ≥ 0. But, seeing as β 6= 0 by assumption, it follows that
β > 0.
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The supposition for V2(·) is given in Eq. (20), where A, B, and C are constants to be deter-
mined, and where V ′2(x) = Ax−1+B and V ′′2 (x) = −Ax−2. Substitutingu = −βb−1[V ′2(x)]−1 >
0 and the expressions for V2(x), V ′2(x) and V ′′2 (x) in Eq. (19) gives
rA ln x+ rBx+ rC = α ln x+ β ln[−b−1β[Ax−1 +B]−1] + aBx+ aA− β −
1
2
σ2A. (37)
Equating coefficients on like terms in Eq. (37) results in
A = r−1(α + β), (38a)
B = 0, (38b)
C = r−1β[ln(−b−1rβ(α+ β)−1)− 1] + r−2(α + β)
(
a−
1
2
σ2
)
, (38c)
as the values of the three constants such that Eq. (20) is the stage two current value function.
Now observe that u = −βb−1[V ′2(x)]−1 = −βb−1r(α + β)−1x > 0, which is equivalent to
b(α+ β) < 0, because none of the terms in the product can be zero and x > 0, β > 0 and r > 0.
Finally, in order to prove that sign[∂T ∗/∂σ2] = sign[α + β], first recall that the initial state
variable is not a decision variable and the terminal state is a scalar. Upon setting S1(xT ) +ψT =
V2(xT ) and using Eq. (38), it follows that Eqs. (10a) and (10c) implicitly yield the optimal values
of (T, xT ). It then follows from differentiating the identity form of Eqs. (10a) and (10c) with
respect to σ2 that:
H∗
[
∂T ∗(β)/∂σ2
∂x∗T (β)/∂σ
2
]
≡
[
−1
2
r−1e−rT (α + β)
0
]
, (39)
and therefore that ∂T ∗(β)/∂σ2 ≡ −1
2
r−1e−rT (α + β)(VˆxTxT + e
−rTS1xT xT ) / |H
∗|. Given the
second-order sufficient conditions, the result sign[∂T ∗/∂σ2] = sign[α+β] is immediate. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6. The first-order necessary condition of the maximization problem in
Eq. (22) is equivalent to u = β−12 [β1 + bV ′2(x)] ≥ 0, the inequality following from the fact that
the control variable is constrained to be nonnegative. The second-order necessary condition is
−β2 ≤ 0, which is equivalent to β2 ≥ 0. But seeing as β2 6= 0 by assumption, it follows that
β2 > 0.
Substituting u = β−12 (β1 + bV ′2(x)) and the expressions for V2(x), V ′2(x) and V ′′2 (x) into Eq.
(23), yields:
1
2
rAx2 + rBx+ rC =
(
aA+
1
2
b2β−12 A
2 −
1
2
α2
)
x2 + (α1 + aB + b
2β−12 AB + bβ1β
−1
2 A)x
(40)
+
(
1
2
β21β
−1
2 +
1
2
b2β−12 B
2 + bβ1β
−1
2 B +
1
2
σ2A
)
.
Equating coefficients on like terms in Eq. (40) yields the solutions for A, B, and C given in
Proposition 6. Recalling that u = β−12 (β1 + bV ′2(x)) ≥ 0 which, because β2 > 0, is equivalent to
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β1 + bV
′
2(x) = β1 + bB + bAx ≥ 0.
Finally, repeating the steps that led to Eq. (39):
H∗
[
∂T ∗(β)/∂σ2
∂x∗T (β)/∂σ
2
]
≡
[
1
2
e−rTA
0
]
,
and therefore that ∂T ∗(β)/∂σ2 ≡ 1
2
e−rTA(VˆxT xT + e
−rTS1xTxT ) / |H
∗| . Given the second-order
sufficient conditions, the result sign[∂T ∗/∂σ2] = −sign[A] follows. Q.E.D.
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